In this paper we give a new proof of the characterization of the closed fragment of the provability logic of Heyting's Arithmetic. We also provide a characterization of the closed fragment of the provability logic of Heyting's Arithmetic plus Markov's Principle and Heyting's Arithmetic plus Primitive Recursive Markov's Principle.
Introduction
Friedman's 35th problem was to give a decision procedure for the closed fragment of the provability logic of Peano Arithmetic, PA. See [Fri75] . It was indepently solved by van Benthem (see: [vB74] ), Boolos (see: [Boo76] ) and Bernardi & Montagna (unpublished). The story of this result is told in [BS91] . The solution of Friedman's question would seem to be the end of the story of closed fragments: the characterization given is simple and definitive. Moreover, as we now know, it is amazingly stable. The same characterization works for all Σ 0 1 -sound recursively enumerable extensions of Buss' theory S 1 2 .
1 Very roughly speaking, one could say that it works in all theories in which one can arithmetize employing the usual recursive presentations of syntax. Thus, it almost works for all theories for which the question makes sense at all.
However, the situation changes dramatically, when we go on to consider the provability logics of constructive theories. New obstacles arise to the proof. We proceed to the next level in difficulty. Different theories will have markedly different closed fragments. In my preprint [Vis85] , I gave characterizations and corresponding decision procedures for the closed fragments of HA and HA .
2
The characterizations are reasonably simple. However, in the case of HA, the verification of the characterization involves a complicated algorithm. I was not happy with its presentation and tried to improve it in [Vis94] . Finally the result was published in [Vis02] . Unfortunately, this final presentation still employs the original unperspicuous algorithm.
In the present paper, I will give a new proof of my old result by formalizing a Smoryński style Kripke model argument. It is somewhat surprising that the possibility of such a formalization was so long overlooked. One reason that it was so easy to overlook, is that one embeds classical methods inside a purely constructive argument. The new proof, with minor adaptations, also yields a characterization of the closed fragments of the provability logics of HA + MP and HA + MP PR .
Why are these results interesting? We can view the question from two perspectives. The first perspective starts with the arithmetical theories. These theories are natural theories. This study throws light on a salient property of these theories. The second perspective is the perspective of the closed fragments themselves. The description of the closed fragment is a direct generalization of the second incompleteness theorem. In the context of the results for constructive theories, the classical case appears in a new light. We understand it as a special case of a more general pattern. Thus, enlarging the scope of our enquiry to the constructive case tells us something essential about closed fragments. Finally, apart from any specific perspective, one can say that a beautiful underlying mathematical structure is revealed.
Prerequisites
We presuppose a background in provability logic. See e.g. [Boo93] or [Smo85] . We also presuppose basic knowledge of constructive arithmetic. See e.g [Tro73] or [TvD88] . The chapter [Smo73] of [Tro73] will be especially relevant.
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The Framework
The results of the paper fit a reasonably simple framework. In this section we describe this framework.
The question we are studying is to characterize the closed fragments of the provability logics of certain arithmetical theories. This introduces two kinds of theories and their connection. We have closed constructive provability logics and arithmetical theories. The connection between the kinds is formed by translations of the language of modal logic without propositional variables into the language of arithmetic. In our framework we will employ a third kind of theories, to wit theories of degrees of falsity. The theories of degrees of falsity are connected to closed provability logics via a translation of their language into the language of modal logic without propositional variables. We proceed to introduce these three kinds of theories and the relevant translations.
Degrees of Falsity
The intended arithmetical meaning of the degrees of falsity is: iterated inconsistency statements for the given arithmetical theory T .
Let ω + := ω ∪ {∞}. We let α, β, . . . , range over the degrees of falsity. We use m, n, . . . , for the finite degrees of falsity, i.e., the natural numbers. We equip ω + with the usual ordering and define ∞ + 1 := ∞. Note that the successor function remains injective under this extension.
The language D of theories of degrees of falsity is the language given by:
The theory Basic is given by intuitionistic propositional logic with 0 in the role of ⊥ and ∞ in the role of , plus the principles α → β, for α ≤ β. A theory of degrees of falsity is any extension of Basic in D. We will use ∆, Γ, . . . , to range over arbitrary theories of degrees of falsity. We identify ¬ φ with (φ → 0). An extension of Γ of Basic is called p-sound iff it does not imply any sentence of the form α → β, for β < α. We will be mainly interested in p-sound theories. Here are some further important notions.
• A theory Γ is decent if, for every φ and for every n larger than all finite m occurring in φ, we have Γ n → φ implies Γ φ.
• α Γ (φ) := max{α | Γ α → φ}. If there is no such maximum, α Γ (φ) is undefined.
The decency of Γ is a rather natural sufficient condition for the totality of α Γ .
Theorem 2.1 If Γ is decent, then, for any φ, we have that α Γ (φ) is defined. Moreover, α Γ (φ) is either ∞ or a finite k occurring in φ.
Proof
Suppose Γ is decent. Let n be the maximal finite number occurring in φ. In case Γ (n + 1) → φ, we have, by decency, that α Γ (φ) = ∞. Otherwise, there is a maximal k ≤ n such that Γ k → φ. So α Γ (φ) = k. We show that k occurs in φ. Let φ be the result of replacing every occurrence of any m ≥ k in φ by ∞. We have Γ k → (φ ↔ φ). It follows that Γ k → φ, and, hence, that Γ φ. Let k be the smallest s ≥ k occurring in φ. Clearly, Γ k → (φ ↔ φ), and hence Γ k → φ. So, by the maximality of k, we have that k = k, and, hence, that k occurs in φ. P
Here are some salient extensions of Basic.
•
Each of these theories is p-sound and decent. (In this paper we will prove the p-soundness and decency of Basic and Stable.)
Closed Constructive Provability Logics
We turn to closed constructive provability logics. The modal language L 0 2 of closed logics is given as follows.
The theory iGL 0 , intuitionistic Löb's Logic on zero variables, is the L 0 2 -theory axiomatized by intuitionistic propositional logic plus the following axioms and rules.
A closed provability logic is any extension of iGL 0 in L 0 2 that is closed under L4. We let Λ, Θ, . . . , range over closed provability logics. We define the modal degrees of falsity as follows.
• P 0 ⊥ := ⊥,
We translate D into L 0 2 via the translation emb 0 given by the following clauses.
• emb 0 (α) := P α ⊥,
• emb 0 commutes with the propositional connectives.
Consider any closed logic Λ. We define:
The theory TDF Λ is the theory of degrees of falsity of Λ.
• For φ, ψ in D:
The relation ∼ Λ is the relation of provably deductive consequence w.r.t. Λ. We write ≈ Λ for the induced equivalence relation.
Note that TDF is monotonic w.r.t. theory extension.
Since emb 0 is a fixed embedding we will, when no confusion is possible, omit it. Thus, e.g., we will treat TDF Λ as if it is a fragment of Λ. We will write α Λ for α TDFΛ . We will say that Λ is p-sound if TDF Λ is p-sound and that Λ is decent if TDF Λ is decent.
We prove a number of basic theorems. Consider any closed provability logic Λ. Clearly, TDFΛ and ∼ Λ are preorders on the language of D of theories of degrees of falsity. Moreover, ∼ Λ extends TDFΛ . I.o.w., the identity mapping supports a functor π λ from the preorder category TDFΛ to the preorder category ∼ Λ .
Theorem 2.2 Consider any p-sound closed provability logic Λ. Suppose π Λ has a left adjoint Φ Λ whose range consists of degrees of falsity. Then we have:
6. The function α Λ is total and α Λ (φ) = Φ Λ (φ).
Proof
Items (1), (2) and (3) are well known facts about adjunctions, noting that we have suppressed π λ , since it is supported by the idenity mapping. See [Mac71] . Item (4) follows from (2) and (3).
We prove (5), By (2), we have Φ Λ (β) TDFΛ β. So, by p-soundness, we have:
We prove (6). It is sufficient to show that Φ Λ satisfies the conditions for
We state a sufficient condition for the existence of a left adjoint of π Λ .
Theorem 2.3 Suppose Λ is a p-sound closed provability logic. Suppose further that α Λ is total and, for all φ in D, we have
Let Λ be a closed provability logic. Suppose that α Λ is total and φ ∼ Λ α Λ (φ).
So, we find: α Λ (φ) ∼ Λ φ and φ ∼ Λ ψ and ψ ∼ Λ α Λ (ψ). We may conclude:
Remark 2.4 Note that the proof did not use all the data of the theorem. We did not use the maximality of α T but only the fact that α Λ (φ) TDFΛ φ.
Let Λ be a p-sound closed provability logic for which α Λ is a left adjoint of π Λ . We define the function nf
• nf Λ commutes with the propositional connectives,
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5 Let Λ be a p-sound closed provability logic for which α Λ is a left adjoint of π Λ . We have Λ φ ↔ nf Λ (φ).
The proof is a simple induction on φ, using Theorem 2.2. P Theorem 2.5 yields a characterization of a Λ that satisfies its conditions in terms of nf Λ , since we have Λ φ iff nf Λ (Pφ) = ∞. In its turn nf Λ is completely determined by α Λ , which is fixed by TDF Λ . This result will be the central in our characterization of the closed fragments of HA, HA + MP and HA + MP PR .
Remark 2.6 Note that we can view the result as follows. Suppose Λ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2.5. We can now enrich the language of Λ with new constants α -now not considered as defined-and we can add axioms α ↔ P α ⊥ to Λ. We extend the necessitation rule to the system with the new axioms. Let's call the resulting system Λ + . Now Theorem 2.5 tells us that we have box-elimination in Λ + .
Consider any theory of degrees of falsity Γ for which α Γ is defined. We can construct a closed provability logic from Γ in the following way. We first extend the language of Γ with the modal operator P. For any φ in D, we add an axiom Pφ ↔ (α Γ (φ) + 1). Next, we replace 0 and ∞ by ⊥ and . Finally, we take the reduct of the resulting theory to the language without 1, 2, . . . We call the theory thus obtained AL Γ , the associated logic of Γ. It is easy to see that AL Γ is a closed provability logic.
Example 2.7 The operation AL is not monotonic w.r.t. theory extension. E.g., we have AL Basic P¬¬P⊥ → PP⊥, but AL Stable P¬¬P⊥ → PP⊥.
Here are the expected consequences of our definition.
Theorem 2.8 Suppose that Γ is p-sound and that α Γ is total. We have:
Item (1) is immediate since AL Γ is just a 'definitional extension' of Γ. Item (2) follows from Theorem 2.3. Finally, (3) follows from (2) and Theorem 2.2. P Remark 2.9 The box of AL Γ is in a sense the minimal box of a closed provability logic which has Γ as its theory of degrees of falsity. Suppose α Γ is total. Let Λ be any closed provability logic such that TDF Λ = Γ. We have, for φ in D:
Open Question 2.10 Let Γ be p-sound and suppose that α Γ is total. Consider all logics Λ with TDF Λ = Γ ordered by theory extension. It is easy to see that iGL + {emb 0 (φ) | Γ φ} is the minimal element of this structure. Moreover, since every formula of AL Γ is equivalent to emb 0 (φ) for some φ in D, we have, for every strict extension Θ of AL Γ , that TDF Θ is a strict extension of Γ. Ergo, AL Γ is a maximum of our structure. It would be interesting to have more information about this structure. E.g., are there other maxima?
Open Question 2.11 Can we axiomatize AL Basic and AL Stable ? I conjecture that such an axiomatization will demand extended schemes involving finite disjunctions and conjunctions of variable length.
Arithmetical Theories
Let T be any constructive ce theory with a designated interpretation K of iS 1 2 , the intuitionistic version of Buss' iS 1 2 . We write P T A for the formalization of: A is provable in T . This formalization is supposed to be executed 'inside' the interpretation K. We interpret the formulas of L 0 2 in T , via an interpretation emb T 1 that commutes with the propositional connectives and sends Pφ to P T emb T 1 (φ). We define the closed fragment of T as follows.
Note that CF need not be monotonic w.r.t. extension of theories. We define an interpretation of emb T 2 of D into the language of T by:
The degrees of falsity of T are the formulas P α T ⊥ := emb T 2 (α). We write TDF T for: TDF CF T , and ∼ T for: ∼ CF T .
We will study the closed fragments of three salient theories: HA, HA + MP PR , and HA + MP. To prepare our results we will consider a specific class of theories containing the target theories. Let's say that T is a ha-theory if T is a theory in the language of arithmetic that is HA-verifiably a Π 0 2 -conservative extension of HA. Note that this notion is intensional: the arithmetical formula defining the axiom set of a given theory should be part of the data specifying the theory. This formula is needed to make sense of the question of a theory being a ha-theory. We can easily provide examples of pairs of theories that are extensionally the same of which one is a ha-theory and of which the other is not. For the theories we are considering like HA + MP, we assume that they are defined by a natural formula.
The ha-theories include HA, HA , HA + MP, HA + MP PR , HA + ECT 0 , MA := HA + ECT 0 + MP and PA. Note that ha-theories are Π 0 2 -sound. Note that it follows that the closed fragment of any ha-theory is p-sound.
For all ha-theories U , V , and W , we have U P α V ⊥ ↔ P α W ⊥, since any ha-theory is a HA-verifiably a Π 0 2 -conservative extension of HA. So, modulo Uprovable equivalence, the degrees of falsity of any of our theories are the same as the corresponding degrees of falsity of any other of our theories. This justifies us in suppressing the embedding emb T 3 in the context of any ha-theory. We will treat TDF T simply as a fragment of T . We use α T for α TDF T , etc.
For the theories HA, HA , HA + MP, HA + MP PR and PA, all the information about the closed fragment is contained in the theory of the degrees of falsity. In fact, for each target theory T of this list, we have CF T = AL TDF T . Here are the theories of the degrees of falsity of our target theories.
We will provide a new proof for (1) (see also [Vis02] ), and we will prove (3) for the first time in this paper. For (2), see [Vis02] . Finally, (3) is an immediate consequence of the classical answer to Friedman's problem. We will show that, for the theories HA, HA + MP, HA + MP PR , the mapping α T is the left adjoint of π T . Moreover, α T is computable. This implies that nf T is computable. Since we have, for φ in L 0 2 , that CF T φ iff nf T (Pφ) = ∞, we obtain a decision procedure for CF T .
For the proofs of the analogous facts for HA , see [Vis02] . For PA, see the classical literature.
Small Beer
In this section we collect some small facts in the environment of our main result. This section can very well be skipped.
Structural Facts about Theories of Degrees of Falsity
A first observation is that α Γ , if defined, is monotonic in Γ.
One can show by a Kripke model argument that the theories Stronglöb and Classical are maximal among p-sound theories.
Theorem 3.1 Classical is the unique maximal p-sound extension of Stable.
Proof
Let Γ be a p-sound extension of Stable. Suppose Γ φ. We have:
for some selection of pairs α, β. Since we have the principles of Classical inside double negation, we find: Γ ¬¬ (α → β). Ergo, Γ (α → ¬¬β), and, hence, Γ (α → β), since Γ extends Stable. So, we find, by p-soundness, α ≤ β, for each pair α, β in our conjunction. It follows that Classical φ. P Suppose HA φ ↔ P , where P is Π 0 2 and where φ is (a standard interpretation of a sentence) in D. By reasoning in Basic, we have HA ¬¬φ ↔ (α → ¬¬β), where α, β ranges over a finite set of such pairs with β < α. We find that: HA P → (α → ¬¬β). Hence by the Friedman translation w.r.t. β:
Since P is Π 0 2 , we have HA P → P β . Ergo, HA P → (α → β).
Conversely, we have HA (α → β) → ¬¬P . Say P is ∀x Sx, where Sx is Σ 0 1 . By Friedman translating w.r.t. Sa, we get:
Hence HA (α → β) → Sa, and, so, HA (α → β) → P . Combining we get: HA (α → β) ↔ P .
Note that our argument works for every ha-theory for which Friedman's translation works with Σ 0 1 -formulas as 'superscript formulas'. For ha-theories T that are extensions of HA + MP PR we can reason more directly.
Let T be a ha-theory that extends HA + MP PR . Clearly for any Π 0 2 -formula Q, we have T ¬¬ Q ↔ Q. Suppose T P ↔ φ, for P in Π 0 2 and φ in L 0 . We have T ¬¬ P ↔ ¬¬ (α → β), by elementary reasoning. Since both P and (α → β) are Π 0 2 , we find: T P ↔ (α → β).
TDF as a Mapping of Theories
We note that TDF T is monotonic in T .
Here is another simple insight. Let T be a ha-theory. Then, HA + TDF T is a hatheory and TDF HA+TDF T = TDF T . It is important to note that to understand the insight properly we have to think intensionally. E.g., the formula defining the theory HA+TDF T goes into the verification of the fact that it is a subtheory of T . We assume that this formula is an obvious formula involving the formula defining the axiom set of T .
Open Question 3.3 If we run through ha-theories which theories of degrees of falsity are assumed. I.o.w, what is the range of the mapping TDF? E.g., is every ce r-sound theory of degrees of falsity extensionally equal to the TDF T of a ha-theory T ?
We provide a modest partial result.
Theorem 3.4 Let Γ be an intensionally given ce extension of Stable and suppose that:
Then, HA + MP PR + Γ is a ha-theory and TDF HA+MP PR +Γ = Γ.
Proof
We assume the hypothesis of the theorem. Reason in HA. Suppose P is Π 0 2 and that P HA+MP PR +Γ P . Then, for some finite conjunction γ of formulas from Γ, P HA+MP PR (γ → P ). It follows that P HA+MP PR (¬¬ γ → P ). Moreover, for some finite set of pairs α, β, we have P HA+MP PR (¬¬γ ↔ (α → β)). So we have (i) P HA+MP PR +Γ (α → β) and (ii) P HA+MP PR ( (α → β) → P ). By our hypothesis, we have from (i): P HA+MP PR (α → β). So, by (ii), we find P HA+MP PR P . Hence, P HA P . We may conclude that HA + MP PR + Γ is a ha-theory.
Suppose HA + MP PR + Γ φ. Then, since Γ extends Stable, by the results of the next section: Γ φ. So, Γ = TDF HA+MP PR +Γ . P
The Main Result
We first provide Smoryński style Kripke arguments to characterize TDF HA , TDF HA+MP PR and TDF HA+MP . Then, by formalizing these arguments, we prove the existence of a left adjoint of the embedding of T into ∼ T , considered as preorderings on D, for T one of these three theories.
Kripke Model Arguments
We show that Basic provides a complete axiomatization of TDF HA . A Kripke model for Basic is a Kripke model in the usual sense with α ∈ ω + as atoms for the atomic forcing. Here we use 0 in the role of ⊥ and ∞ in the role of . We demand: k n and m ≥ n implies k m. A Kripke model for Basic is finite iff it has a finite number of nodes and, for some number N , we have that N is forced in all nodes. Consider any Kripke model K for Basic such that K φ. Let N be larger than all finite atoms occurring in φ. We transform our model to a model K by resetting the atomic forcing to: k n iff k n or n ≥ N . It is easy to see that K is again a model of Basic and K φ. We collapse K by dividing out the maximal bisimulation, thus obtaining a finite model J of Basic with J φ. We have shown:
Theorem 4.1 The class of all finite Kripke models for Basic is complete for Basic.
It follows immediately that
Basic is decent. We have: Theorem 4.2 For all φ in D, α Basic (φ) is defined. Moreover α Basic (φ) is computable by a multi-exponential algorithm.
Proof
The fact that α Basic is total, follows from decency.
Let N be the smallest finite degree of falsity not occurring in φ. We construct a finite Henkin model for ordinary propositional logic for the formula ψ := (N ∧ {(k → ) | k < < N }), where we take as the nodes of the model saturated subsets of the subformulas of φ and ψ plus ∞. One may show that, for k ≤ N , we have Basic
It follows that we can determine α Basic (φ) by running through H. P
We define, for finite Kripke models of Basic:
• ν k is the largest n such that k n.
Note that in a finite Kripke model the atomic forcing is completely determined by the ν k . Consider any D-formula φ. Suppose Basic φ. We show that HA φ. Consider a finite Kripke model for Basic that does not force φ at the root. We unravel this model to a finite Kripke tree, say T . We build a model T of HA on the frame of T . We associate to every node k a model M k of PA + ¬ ν k + (ν k + 1) as follows. Suppose we have already assigned M k to k. We will have insured that M k satisfies PA + ¬ ν k + (ν k + 1). Let be a direct successor of k. In case ν = ν k , we put M := M k . In case ν < ν k , we proceed as follows. Note that ¬ ν k is PA-provably equivalent to con(PA + ¬ (ν k − 1)). Since ν ≤ ν k − 1, we have:
By Löb's Theorem, it follows that: + (ν + 1) ).
By the Feferman-Henkin construction, we can find an interpretation H ν : (PA + con(PA + ¬ν + (ν + 1))) £ (PA + ¬ν + (ν + 1)).
We take M := MOD(H ν )(M k ), i.e., the internal model of M k given by H ν . Clearly: M |= PA + ¬ν + (ν + 1).
Since the cone above each node is internally definable in the model associated to that node, we find, by Smoryński's reasoning, that T HA. See [Smo73] . Moreover, since, for Σ 0 1 -sentences S, we have k S ⇔ M k |= S, we find: k n ⇔ M k |= n. By our construction, it follows that T is equal to T if we restrict T to the degrees of falsity (modulo emb 3 ). We may conclude that T φ.
We can easily adapt our argument to establish a similar result for HA + MP and HA + MP PR . The proof of the finite model property for Stable is word for word the same. It follows that Stable is decent. Let's say that a finite Kripke model for Basic is upwards reflecting if, for every node k there is a top-node k ≥ k. such that k ¬ ν k , i.o.w., such that the atomic forcing of k is the same as the atomic forcing of k. By a simple argument one can show that a finite Kripke model for Basic is a finite Kripke model for Stable iff it is upwards reflecting. We may conclude: Theorem 4.3 We have completeness for Stable in the class of finite upwards reflecting Kripke models for Basic.
Also the argument for the multi-exponential computability of α Stable is the same.
Theorem 4.4 We have: α Stable is total and computable by a multi-exponential algorithm.
We clearly have that Stable is a subtheory of TDF HA+MP PR and TDF HA+MP . Suppose Stable φ. We show that HA + MP φ. Let T be an upwards reflecting finite Kripke tree such that the root of T does not force φ. Consider the model T constructed above. Note that, by the construction, it has the property that above each node k there is a top node k such that M k = M k .
We claim that T forces Markov's Principle. Suppose k ∀x (A 0 x ∨ ¬ A 0 x) and k ¬¬ ∃x A 0 x. Let k be a top node above k such that
Let a be a domain element such that k A 0 a. We find that k ¬A 0 a, and so, by decidability, k A 0 a. Thus, k ∃x A 0 x.
It follows that Stable provides a complete axiomatization for TDF HA+MP and TDF HA+MP PR .
Formalization of Kripke Models
Our next step is to verify the completeness side of the two above proofs inside HA. The result gets the form: HA P T φ → P T α T (φ), where T is one of our three target theories. By Theorem 2.3, this is precisely what we need to show that α T is left adjoint to π T . Thus, we obtain the desired characterization.
To realize our program, we will have to eliminate the reference to models and replace it fully by talk about interpretations. In fact we will view k A as an arithmetical formula B. Let T be any finite tree model of Basic which forces some finite N . Let the ordering of T be . We write ≺ 1 for: direct successor in the -relation. We define a translation as follows.
• Suppose k ≺ 1 . Then, H k := ID, iff ν k = ν and
Here H ν is as defined in Subsection 4.1. We write F k for (a formula representing) the Dedekind embedding of ID into H k . I.o.w., F k is an arithmetical formula that represents the initial embedding of the numbers of the given extension of PA into the numbers of the interpretation H ν .
• Suppose k = 0 ≺ 1 1 ≺ 1 . . . ≺ 1 n−1 = k . Then:
We write δ kk for δ H kk .
• It is convenient to give our definitions by restricting the given Kripke model to the cone above a given node k. Thus, our definitions are for 'the model as it looks according to k'.
Note that F kk k is the Dedekind embedding of H kk into H kk .
• We define a mapping (·) (·) (·) from pairs of nodes and arithmetical sentences to arithmetical sentences.
Proof
We treat (iv). Suppose k = m 0 ≺ 1 m 1 ≺ 1 . . . ≺ 1 m n−1 = . We have in T k :
Suppose k k k . The proof is by induction on A.
For the base case, we reason in T k . We have:
The cases of ⊥, , conjunction, disjunction and existential quantification are easy.
We treat the case of implication. The case of the universal quantifier is similar. Reason in T k . We have:
H kk P Fact 4.7 Persistence: Suppose k k k . We have:
The proof is by a simple induction on A. The atomic case uses the fact that the Dedekind embedding is an embedding of structures. P Fact 4.8 We have, verifiably in HA, that, for any finite Γ x, if Γ x IQC A x, then:
The proof is by induction on the number of steps in the IQC-proof. P Fact 4.9 Let a finite tree for Basic be given. We have, verifiably in HA, that, for any k k and for any axiom C of HA, we have T k (k k C).
Remark 4.11
There is an alternative proof of Theorem 4.10 following an idea of Smoryński which avoids most of the inductive cases: one uses the fact that Matijacevič's theorem can be verified in HA. This proof has the advantage of being simpler. It has the disadvantage of using a major theorem. Moreover, it does not downwards generalize -as far as we know-to e.g. iI∆ 0 .
Fact 4.12 Let a finite Kripke tree for Basic be given. We have, for k k , verifiably in T k , that k k ν k and k k (ν k + 1).
Proof
Reason in T k . We have already seen that k k HA. We also have k k ν k iff ν H kk k . Since, H kk interprets T k , we have ¬ ν H kk k . Ergo, k k ν k . The other case is similar. P Fact 4.13 Let a finite Kripke tree for Basic be given. Suppose k k . Suppose k φ. We have T k (k k φ). Similarly, if k φ, then, T k (k k φ).
The proof is by induction on φ using Fact 4.12. P Theorem 4.14 Consider any φ in L 0 . We have: HA P HA φ → P HA α Basic (φ).
In case α Basic (φ) = ∞, this is trivial. We assume that α Basic (φ) is finite. By Kripke completeness, we can find a finite Kripke tree for Basic with root b, such that and b φ and ν b = α Basic (φ). Reason in HA. Suppose P HA φ. It follows that P T b (b b φ). On the other hand, since b φ, we have: P T b (b b φ). Ergo, P T b ⊥. Hence, P PA ((ν b + 1) → ν b ). By Löb's Theorem, in combination with the verifiable Π 0 2 -conservativity of PA over HA, we find that P PA ν b and, thus, P HA ν b . In other words, P HA α Basic (φ). P To adapt our proof to HA + MP PR and HA + MP. The only extra step is to verify in that, for a finite upwards reflecting tree T , we have, in HA, that k k (HA + MP). The argument needed to do that closely follows the argument at the end of Subsection 4.1. So we have:
Theorem 4.15 Consider any φ in L 0 . Let U be either HA+MP PR or HA+MP.
We have: HA P U φ → P U α Stable (φ).
We have proved the conditions of Theorem 2.3 for the pairs CF HA , Basic and CF HA+MP PR , Stable and CF HA+MP , Stable. This completes our characterization of the closed fragments of HA, HA + MP PR , and HA + MP. We have:
• CF HA = AL Basic ,
• CF HA+MP = CF HA+MP PR = AL Stable .
Example 4. 16 We provide an example of a theory that does not conform to our pattern. Define T := HA + {(n → (1 ∨ ¬1)) | n ∈ ω}. Since T is between HA and PA, we find that T is a ha-theory.
Suppose that T P T (1 ∨ ¬1). It follows by the Π 0 2 -soundness of T that T 1 ∨ ¬1. By a simple Kripke model argument we can show that T has the disjunction property. So T 1 or T ¬1. Quod non.
Suppose that T P T (1 ∨ ¬1) ↔ n. It follows that T (n + 1) → n, and hence T n. Quod non.
We may conclude that, for no β, we have T P T (1 ∨ ¬1) ↔ β. Note that TDF T is not decent, so the question remains for a decent example that does not conform to the pattern.
